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Territorial Restriction and Exclusive
Dealing Clauses Under European
Economic Community and United States
Antitrust Laws*
Luc Pierre Benoit, Juris Doctor**
THE QUEST
Given man's innate sense of territory' and the traditionally
individualistic nature of his ownership concept,2 demands upon the
legal profession for territorial restriction and exclusive dealing sys-
tems have predictably been frequent and provocative of countervail-
ing judicial reaction.3 A growing recognition of the potential of verti-
cal restrictions to stimulate interbrand competition while simulta-
neously reducing intrabrand rivalry has led to a softer judicial line
conceding room to a rule of reason in the territorial restriction area,
at least as represented by location clauses.' Similarly, the evolution
of quantitative substantiality and qualitative substantiality' tests
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1. I regard the territorial imperative as no less essential to the existence of
contemporary man than it was to those bands of small-brained proto-men on the
high African savannah millions of years ago. I see it as a force shaping our lives in
countless unexpected ways, threatening our existence only to the degree that we fail
to understand it.
R. AnanXv, THz TsisirroiuAL Ism.s'v 7 (1963).
2. D. Tias, Romsctms Ractrr 148 (1975).
3. For an extreme reaction, see United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967) discussed in text accompanying notes 97-100 infra.
4. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36-(1977) discussed in text
accompanying notes 52-55 and 107-110 infra.
5. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). See also text accompa-
nying notes 42-43 infra.
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has provided a certain tolerance for exclusive dealing arrangements.
Since these tests are, however, far from clear in practical impli-
cation and application,' while continuing to be of strong interest and
concern not only domestically but increasingly transnationally, the
Subcommittee on Technology Transfer Law (STTL) of the Commit-
tee on Law and Technology of the Los Angeles County Bar Associa-
tion has embarked on a modest, practice-oriented inquiry into terri-
torial restriction and exclusive dealing clauses for transnational dis-
tributorship and licensing agreements. In particular, the STTL has
developed an exclusive dealing clause which recently has experi-
enced its inauguration in transnational technology products distrib-
utorship agreements in the following form:
Manufacturer and Distributor realize as to the Territory that
Manufacturer has only a minor market share for the kind of prod-
ucts subject to this Agreement, that such products require compe-
tent assembly and service, backed up by a supply and installation
of proper spare parts and components for faultless operation and
prevention of injury and environmental pollution, that competitive
products are readily available and that no serious obstacles to a
formation of new outlets for competitive products exist. In view of
these conditions, and as long as they prevail or reoccur, the Dis-
tributor will not promote, carry, distribute or install any product,
spare part or component other than a product, spare part or com-
ponent manufactured and/or supplied by Manufacturer, or ex-
pressly authorized in writing by Manufacturer by way of excep-
tion.'
The present study constitutes an endeavor to transfer the
STTL efforts to the transnational arena. For this purpose, we shall
presently review relevant statutory law and jurisprudence of the
European Economic Commurity (EEC) which represents an in-
creasingly important segment of transnational commerce and trade,
given the extent of its current membership,' its extraterritorial asso-
ciations and conventions, its socioeconomic contributions, and its
trade partnership with the United States of America (U.S.).
6. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961); Maico Co., 50 F.T.C.
485 (1953). See also text accompanying notes 46-47 infr
7. C. HuiS, Amrnmusr AnvisR § 2.6 (2d ed. 1978).
S. This clause was developed as a result of extensive discussion and deliberation within
the ST'r:. Although not formally adopted by the Subcommittee, the clause will hereinafter
be referred to as the "STTL clause."
9. Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Republic of Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland.
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HisTOmcAL Simunms AND DIFFERENCES
The U.S. antitrust laws and the EEC competition laws arose
in the wake of devastating wars: here, the era of industrial expan-
sion and economic power concentration following the American
Civil War;'0 there, the epoch of reconstruction and unification after
cataclysmic World War II."
By way of comparison to the American experience, World War
I, rather than World War I1, reflects from a European viewpoint a
civil war of sorts within the European cultural community." Yet
while the American Civil War managed to avoid secession, World
War I and its aftermath fortified and, in effect, institutionalized an
ongoing polarization along national lines. This result, together with
concomitant economic stagnation, fostered intense industrial car-
telization which engendered strong support for emerging nationa-
list moves.'3 World War I led to widespread destruction and ruin,
exposing major parts of Europe to possible colonialism by leading
world powers and to creeping Balkanization.
Eventually, two of the four occupying powers came to perceive
an increasingly precarious position relative to existing and potential
superpowers." The possibility that Europe would, in a sense, find
itself socioeconomically and politically at the level of colonial Amer-
ica was real. Thus, where for generations economic motives had
supplied temptation and apparent reason for resorting to war to
settle national aspirations, and where war had ceased to be feasible,
the recognition gradually emerged that economic motives and re-
sources could serve as safeguards against war on the one hand,'5 and
virtual colonialism and Balkanization on the other.
In summary, the American Civil War prevented a breakup of
an established union and led to a postwar boom characterized by
industrial expansion and power concentration, spurring antitrust
legislation. World War II, on the other hand, brought Europe insta-
bility and a breakdown of systems and presented a danger of relent-
less colonization for the occupied countries and some of the Allied
powers as well. A search for viable solutions led to recognition of a
10. C. Hius, supra note 7, § 1.3.
11. E. Buorr, Euaon AT SiS AND Svis 2 (1961).
12. Id. at 1.
13. J. ToLAN, ADOL HrrLs 303 (1976).
14. E. Bmorr, supra note 11, at I (citing speech by Maurice Faure, French State Secre-
tary for European Affairs, to French Assembly (July, 1957)). See also A. WALSH & J. PAXTON,
INTo EuPoPs 12 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as WALSH].
15. WALSH, supra note 14, at 1.
1978]'
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need for peaceful unification initiated by the creation of a common
market fostered and maintained by "the establishment of a system
ensuring that competition shall not be distorted in the Common
Market."'" These developmental and functional differences must be
remembered when comparing U.S. antitrust and EEC competition
laws. However, despite these differences, the concept of competition
is the key to desired goals and effects in both systems, and as we
shall see, is manifested in considerable "conscious parallelism" be-
tween EEC and U.S. antitrust laws.
STATUTORY SIMnuA.RriEs AND DiFFER ECs
In contrast to the anticompetition scheme of the EEC, the sec-
tions of the Sherman Act primarily of interest here'7 are at once
laconic and draconic." They have at times sheltered such antipodal
manifestations as Schwinn" and its overruling nemesis GTE
Sylvania. 23 Corporate executives have also at times been physically
incarcerated for having violated the Act.2'
Statutory counterparts of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
are found in Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome." Articles 85
16. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 16, art. 3(f) [hereinafter cited as EEC Establishing Treaty).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2 (1976).
18. The text of the statutes reads as follows:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in
any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1, as amended Dec. 12, 1975.
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one
million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2, as amended Dec. 21, 1974.
19. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
20. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
21. C. BANE, THE EizcrmcAL EquMpmmrr CoNsPmAcms 16 (1973); Sonnenfeld & Lawr-
ence, Why Do Companies Succumb to Price Fixing?, 56 HARv. Bus. Ray. 145 (1978). "Justice
Department statistics indicate that 60% of antitrust felons are sentenced to prison terms."
Id. at 145.
22. EEC Establishing Treaty, supra note 16, arts. 85, 86.
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and 86, together with their implementing regulations, are self-
executing provisions," becoming, without further enactment, part
23. The following text of Articles 85 and 86 is from BI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN
ComuuNrrY LAw B10070 (1978) and appears to be a more readable translation than the one
contained in 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
Article 85
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common mar-
ket: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertak-
ings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trad-
ing conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or in-
vestment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such con-
tracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph I may, however, be declared inapplicable in
the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to pro-
moting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the
resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition
in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
Article 86
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the preju-
dice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or ac-
cording to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.
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of the laws of each Member State ratifying the treaty.24
In the enumeration of agreements between enterprises, deci-
sions by association of enterprises and concerted practices apt to
affect trade between the Member States," Article 85 manifests cer-
tain parallels to the "contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce" 2' of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Although not expressly proscribing
concentrations of economic power as such, the Article 86 concept
appears to share a broad philosophical underpinning with Section
2 of the Sherman Act dealing with monopolization. As if to avoid
many questions left unanswered by the broad brush of the Sherman
Act, Articles 85 and 86 illustrate the types of conduct considered
conducive to "prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market" or "abuse of a dominant position
within the common market or in a substantial part of it."" While
territorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act is defined in terms
of "trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations," ' Articles 85 and 86, in an apparent, more narrow reference
to territorial jurisdiction, speak about "trade between the Member
States."'
As the Swiss Watch Case3' patently demonstrates, the Sherman
Act reference to territorial jurisdiction has not been viewed in a
confining sense. Rather, such statutory reference must be viewed in
terms of concession to constitutional mandate: particularly the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution, which cau-
tiously avoids usurpation of intrastate domains by reference to
"Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes."' By way of contrast, such antitrust
24. D. BARouos, D. HALL & J. RAYNzR JAmEs, EEC A1rn-TaUsT LAw 4 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as BAnouNos].
25. EEC Establishing Treaty, supra note 16, art. 85(1).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
27. EEC Establishing Treaty, supra note 16, arts. 85(1)(a)-(3) & 86(a-d).
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2 (1976).
29. EEC Establishing Treaty, supra note 16, arts. 85(1) & 86, preamble.
30. United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 133 F. Supp. 40,
rearg. denied, 134 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); J. RAHL, COMMON MAmsrr AND AmmucAN
AbwrrrRusT 313-63 (1970).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: "The Congress shall have Power . . [to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes
One would do well to heed Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dictum, though enunciated in a
different context, that "[the statutory implications concerning what has been taken from
the States and what has been left to them are of Delphic nature, to be translated into
[Vol. 1
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legislation as the United Kingdom Restrictive Trade Practices Act
is not applicable to an agreement unless two or more parties carry
on business in the United Kingdom.
32
Articles 85 and 86 move somewhere between extremes. A condi-
tion of Article 85 is that the proscribed conduct must affect trade
between Member States. This can be satisfied without the neces-
sity that parties to an agreement, decision, or concerted practice be
domiciled or resident in the Common Market area.u Additionally,
Article 85, in contrast to Section 1 of the Sherman Act, has an
express built-in flexibility in the form of exemption provisions con-
tained in paragraph 3.3 Such flexibility, above and beyond the typi-
cal American "rule of reason" approach, inquires whether an agree-ment, even though substantially restrictive, should nevertheless be
tolerated for good business reasons." Mechanics for implementing
the Article 85 scheme are contained in Regulation 17, the first im-
plementing regulation pursuant to Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
of Rome.Y
ExCLusIVE DEALING CLAUSES
Exclusive dealing clauses within the purview of this study are
concreteness by the process of litigating elucidation." International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958).
32. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eu. 2, c. 68 s. 6 (as amended 1968).
33. B guelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import Export S.A., [19711 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 949,
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Comm. MKT. RRp. (CCH) 8149.
34. Imperial Chemical Inds., Ltd. v. Comm. E.C., [19721 C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 619,
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. ReP. (CCH) 1 8149.
35. EEC Establishing Treaty, supra note 16, art. 85(3).
36. Jones, American Anti-Trust and EEC Competition Law in Comparative Perspective,
90 L.Q. Rzv. 191, 195 (1974).
37. EEC Council Regulation 17, 5 J.O. Comm. Eui. 204 (1962). Regulation 17 authorizes
the EEC Commission to issue decisions and to rule on the applicability of Articles 85(1) and
86 and on the exemption of Article 85(3). An innovation of Regulation 17 relative to the Treaty
of Rome is the power of the Commission to issue negative clearances. These may be obtained
by requests which set forth the agreement, decision or practice to be cleared. The Commission
may then certify that, on the basis of the facts in its possession, there are no grounds under
Article 85(1) or 86 for action on its part. An exemption under Regulation 17 differs from a
negative clearance in that it addresses itself to agreements, decisions or practices which fall
under the proscription of Article 85(1), but are exempted under Article 85(3) upon notification
to, and favorable decision by, the Commission. Regulation 17 also includes an exemption
from the latter notification requirement for enumerated types of agreements. In addition, the
Commission's experience with myriads of agreements has been put to good use in the issuance
of group exemptions; that is, exemptions of certain classes of agreements by category. See
EEC Council Regulation 19/65, 8 J.O. Comm. Eua. 533 (1965); EEC Commission Regulation
67/67, 10 J.O. Comm. EUi. 849 (1967); EC Council Regulation 2821/71, 14 J.O. Comm. EUj.
(No. L 285) 46 (1971); EC Commission Regulation 2779/72, 15 J.O. Comm. Eua. (No. L 292)
23 (1972).
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clauses which restrain a distributor or licensee from handling com-
peting products.31 In U.S. antitrust law, such clauses, absent quali-
fying circumstances, violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act relating
to conditions, agreements, or understandings restraining lessees or
purchasers from using or dealing in the goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or com-
petitors of the lessor or seller. Such clauses are also apt to violate
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act.3' Unlike Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act which
broadly prohibits "unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce,"' 0 Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which does not cover
services, expressly conditions its prohibitory language "where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition,
agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen compe-
tition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."" The
relative word "substantially" in the latter qualification has led
United States courts and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to
develop so-called "substantiality tests." Since relative expressions
naturally have quantitative and qualitative aspects, the need for
quantitative and qualitative substantiality tests was perhaps pre-
dictable. Since quantities, such as market shares expressed in per-
centages, are more easily comprehended and handled than qualita-
tive indicators, it was perhaps equally predictable that the quanti-
38. This is narrower than the broad range of agreements and practices to which the
expression "exclusive dealing" sometimes has been applied. See BARouNos, supra note 24, at
104; J. RAHL, supra note 30, at 208; C. HILus, supra note 7, § 2.2; P. ARERDA, ANITmusT
ANALYSIS para. 552 (1967); Drysdale & Stephens-Ofner, Distributorship and Agency
Agreements, 123 NEw L.J. 728 (1973).
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 14, & 45 (1976). The text of Section 3 of the Clayton Act is as
follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for
use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the
District of Columbia or any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction
of the United States, or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate
upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or
purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller,
where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement,
or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly in any line of commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 45(s)(1) (1976).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
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tative substantiality test would be developed prior to the qualitative
substantiality test; this, indeed, is now a historical fact in the body
of U.S. antitrust decisional law."
According to the quantitative substantiality test, exclusive
dealing contracts which foreclose competition in a substantial share
of the relevant market are unlawful under Section 3 of the Clayton
Act.0 Since Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act" con-
tains no such substantiality qualification, one author has suggested
that the FTC might be able to "issue orders against exclusive buy-
ing arrangements used in foreign commerce on very slight evidence
of competitive impact."u
The FTC pioneered the qualitative substantiality test" which
was subsequently adopted by the United States Supreme Court.'7
That qualitative test looks to evidence of actual or probable eco-
nomic effect upon competition resulting from an exclusive dealing
arrangement. In a similar vein, the celebrated Jerrold Electronics
case" arrived at a limited exception in favor of tying arrangements
relied on by new industries of uncertain success and technologically
delicate equipment." Exceptions in this area have also been recog-
nized when restrictions are aimed at protecting the public and the
manufacturer's goodwill."
In GTE Sylvania, and in the context of nonprice vertical re-
strictions, the Court clearly overrules the landmark Schwinn,5 con-
cept as to per se violation in favor of a "rule of reason" approach.5'
Although dealing with location clauses,6s the Court expresses broad
policy considerations. The Court's reference to a manufacturer's
42. For a discussion of the history and nature of the substantiality tests, see C. Huta,
supro note 7, at 85.92.
43. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
44. 15 U.S.C. # 45 (1976).
45. J. RANL. supra note 30, at 210.
46. Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953).
47. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
48. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd
per curiam, 365 U.S. 567, reh. denied, 365 U.S. 890 (1961).
49. Tying arrangements typically are aimed at compelling the acquisition or use of a lm
desirable product along with an attractive product. Since tying arrangements often have the
effect of excluding competing products, similar considerations have been applied to tying and
to exclusive dealing arrangements. See P. ARmmA, supra note 38, at 568, 634.
50. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 126
(1965); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 931 (1961); Polytechnic Data Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 362 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. l. 1973).
51. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
52. 433 U.S. at 58.
53. This is a type of territorial restriction clause in which the distributor can only roU
from a specific location.
1978]
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direct responsibility for the safety and quality of its products"' and
the Court's willingness to adopt a rule of reason in the complex area
of interbrand and intrabrand competition" justifies the assumption
that the same approach should be used for exclusive dealing clauses.
As a result of these considerations, the STTL exclusive dealing
clause" was developed. The parameters of the qualitative and quan-
titative substantiality tests and other conditions of judicial author-
ity 57 must be carefully noted as to the applicability of this type of
exclusive dealing clause. As a rule, the proposed clause should not
be used in horizontal situations." Use of the clause should be ac-
companied by an appropriate antitrust escape clause to permit
convenient updating of the agreement as the law or the facts change.
In many parts of Europe, tradition renders it an act of disloy-
alty for an exclusive distributor to handle products competing with
the subject matter of the distributorship contract.5' The Court of
Justice of the European Communities, however, has held that such
national prohibitions are not controlling if incompatible with Com-
mon Market law."
While the Treaty of Rome does not expressly parallel Section 3
of the Clayton Act, nevertheless, Claytonesque language is found in
Article 85(3)(b).61 In particular, exclusive distribution agreements,
including those restraining the distributor from acquiring compet-
ing goods may, in a vertical setting, be eligible for exemption, sub-
ject to certain safeguards, under Article 85(3).82
Although not concerned with clauses excluding the handling of
competing goods, implementing Regulation 17" deals specifically
with the related subject of specialization agreements in the manu-
facture of products."4 A specialization agreement exists when parties
mutually agree not to produce each other's products. In Re Jaz-
54. 433 U.S. at 55 n.23.
55. Id. at 52 n.19.
56. See text accompanying note 8 supra. Although set forth as a single clause, the
conditions listed in said clause may be implemented in suitable "whereas clauses."
57. See notes 48-55 supra and accompanying text. Also note particularly that the GTE
Sylvania Court has reiterated the per se illegality of price restrictions. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
58. See Antitrust Guide for International Operations, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust
Division (Release of Jan. 26, 1977), Case J at 46.
59. Co6peratieve vereniging "Suiker Unie" UA v. Comm. E.C., [19751 C. J. Comm. E.
Rec. 1663, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. RAP. (CCH) $ 8334.
60. Id.
61. EEC Establishing Treaty, supra note 16, art. 85(3)(b).
62. See BAROUNOS, supra note 24, at 55.
63. EEC Council Regulation 17, supra note 37.
64. Id. art. 4(3)(c).
[Vol. 1
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Peter,15 a French clock manufacturer, Jaz, and a German clock
manufacturer, Peter, agreed that Jaz was to produce a range of
electrical clocks to the exclusion of Peter, while Peter was to produce
a range of mechanical clocks to the exclusion of Jaz. Each party was
also appointed the other's exclusive distributor in its respective ter-
ritory. Exemption was granted on a finding of resulting improve-
ment of distribution, production, and technical progress. 6 Such lib-
erality in dealing with horizontal arrangements would appear to
justify an expectation that vertical arrangements involving an ex-
clusion of competing products should find approval upon a showing
of an improved distribution of goods free from dispensable restric-
tions and elimination of competition in respect of a substantial part
of the products in question. 7
A special situation exists in the area of agreements of minor
importance. In a rough analogue to the quantitative substantiality
test, the Commission has stated that an agreement between produ-
cers or distributors avoids Article 85(1) prohibitions when the mar-
ket share of the goods in the particular Common Market area does
not exceed five percent with respect to identical or equivalent
goods." To satisfy this quantitative test, the total annual turnover
of the parties must not exceed 15 million units of account or, in the
case of commercial undertakings, 20 million units of account.6' The
Commission also emphasizes that the stated quantitative test is not
absolute, but that restriction of competition may be perceptible
though the specified limits are not reached. Agreements exceeding
the stated limits may conceivably affect trade between Member
States and competition only insignificantly and consequently may
not fall within the provisions of Article 85(1).10 In short, the Com-
mission may pair its quantitative test with a qualitative test,
thereby paralleling, in effect, the substantiality tests of U.S. anti-
trust law."
In the special area of exclusive dealing agreements, the Com-
mission, pursuant to Article 85(3), has established Regulation
65. In re Agreement of Jaz S.A. and Peter Uhren GmbH, [1969] Comm'n E. Comm.,
12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 195) 5 (1969), 9 Comm. MKT. L.R. 129 (1970).
66. The conditions of Article 85(3) were therefore satisfied.
67. EEC Establishing Treaty, supra note 16, art. 85(3)(a-b).
68. Communication of the Commission of May 27, 1970, 13 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. C 64)
1, 2 (1970), 9 COMM. MKT. L.R. D15, D16 (1970).
69. Id. A unit of account has been set as the equivalent of 0.88867088 grams of pure gold,
subject to future modification.
70. Id.
71. See text accompanying notes 41-47 supra.
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67/67,72 granting, inter alia, a group exemption to agreements which
impose an obligation on exclusive dealers not to manufacture or
distribute, for the duration of the contract or one year after its
expiration, goods which compete with the goods to which the con-
tract relates.
3
Such a group exemption must be considered within its regula-
tory context. For instance, the group exemption of Regulation 67/67
does not apply to agreements between more than two parties, ' mu-
tual exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers of compet-
ing goods, 5 or situations wherein contracting parties encumber the
procurement of similar goods by intermediaries or consumers from
other dealers within the Common Market. 71 Parties may create such
difficulties by abusing industrial property rights such as patents7
or by relying upon yet other rights." In the bte noire Bkguelin
case,7' the Court of Justice voided an exclusive distribution agree-
ment under Article 85(1) despite attempted reliance on such "other
rights" as French national legislation against unfair competition."
Regulation 67/67 applies only where an agreement covers less
than the whole of the Common Market." Exclusive dealing agree-
ments for the entire Common Market still must be dealt with by
individual exemption.2 Under Regulation 67/67, the group exemp-
tion may be withdrawn if goods subject to an exclusive distributor
contract have no competition in the particular territory or where the
exclusive dealer arbitrarily overprices or refuses to sell the particu-
lar goods.'3
By way of summary, the STTL clauseu addresses itself to con-
ditions of concern in both U.S. and EEC antitrust systems. There-
fore, it does appear to stand a good chance of being acceptable not
only in the United States, but also in the European Economic Com-
72. RFkglement No. 67/67/CEE de la Commission, 10 J.O. Comm. Eut. 849 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Reg. 67/67].
73. Id. art. 2(1)(a).
74. Id. art. 1(1).
75. Id. art. 3(a).
76. d. art. 3(b).
77. Id. art. 3(b)(1).
78. Id. art. 3(b)(2).
79. [1971] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 949, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Comm. MKT. Ra.
(CCH) 8149.
80. Id.
81. Reg. 67/67, supra note 72, art. l(l)(a).
82. Re Duro-Dyne/Europair, [19741 Comm'n E. Comm., 18 O.J. Eun. Comm. (No. L 29)
11 (1975), 15 COMM. MKT. L.R. D62 (1975-I).
83. Reg. 67/67, supra note 72, art. 6.
84. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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munity, subject to applicable provisions dealing with exemptions,
either automatic or specifically granted, or with negative clear-
ances.
By way of caveat, the proposed exclusive dealing clauses should
not indiscriminately be removed from the context of a distributor-
ship. For instance, considerable caution should be exercised in
transferring this clause to any patent license agreement. The same
courts which readily recognize exclusive agencies in various com-
mercial contexts strictly prohibit attempts by a patent licensor to
restrict a licensee to the patented and licensed product.N
The narrow judicial attitude in the context of licensing agree-
ments appears to reflect a consideration of all patents as
"monopolies." Such attitudes are sometimes uncritically adopted in
textbooks.Y However, as one leading authority has noted, patent
antitrust issues are not necessarily a specialized mystery unrespon-
sive to basic antitrust principles." A plea for equal "rule of reason"
treatment of license agreements concerning patents along with dis-
tributorship agreements concerning product line exclusivity will
hopefully fall upon sympathetic judicial ears.89 As mentioned above,
such is not the current attitude in the United States.
The EC Commission has declined to apply Article 85(3) provi-
sions to a noncompetition clause in a license agreement, where such
clause in the context of the particular agreement was considered to
contribute neither to an improvement of the production or distribu-
tion of goods nor to a promotion of technical or economic progress. N
Based on the language of Article 85(3)," however, an exemption
should be allowed with respect to clauses restricting a licensee from
handling products competing with the subject matter of the license
as long as certain conditions are met. First, such an exclusive deal-
ing clause should be conducive to improvement of production or
distribution of the particular goods or to promotion of technical or
economic progress.' Secondly, it must be shown that the particular
85. Id.
86. McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1948); Park-In Theatres, Inc.
v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 727 (D. Del. 1950). See also P. SWtWE,
Im uwruAL Paopierv MANAGEmNIr 8-34 (1978).
87. See Stedman, Patents and Antitrust Law in C. Hn.is, supra note 7, at 430.
88. P. AREEDA, supra note 38, 400.
89. See McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 1948) (Bone, J.
dissenting).
90. AOIP/Beyrard, [1975] Comm'n E. Comm., 19 O.J. Eun. COMM. (No. L 6) 8 (1976),
17 COMM. MKT. L.R. D15 (1976).
91. EEC Establishing Treaty, supra note 16, art. 85(3).
92. Id.
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exclusive dealing clause does not give rise to the "possibility of
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the prod-
ucts in question."
'' 3
A further problem in licensing is posed by the fact that many
patent and other industrial property licenses are of a horizontal
nature, typically between different manufacturers. Even when run-
ning from an inventor to a manufacturer, licensing agreements do
not fit neatly into a recognized vertical pattern."
TERRITORIAL RESTRICTION CLAUSES
Given historical facts'5 and current aims,6 clashes between ter-
ritorial restriction endeavors and antitrust laws are inevitable. In
the United States, matters peaked in the Schwinn decision in which
Mr. Justice Fortas hurled the anathema of per se violation at terri-
torial restrictions between manufacturers and distributors.Y In
Schwinn, the Court expressly held that "where a manufacturer sells
products to his distributor subject to territorial restrictions upon
resale, a per se violation of the Sherman Act results."" The Court
expanded that rule to encompass situations where a manufacturer
had parted with dominion over goods or had transferred risk of loss
to another." The European Economic Community similarly em-
ploys an assumption-of-risk approach as the decisive criterion to
distinguish between commercial agents and independent traders. A
commercial agent, except for the usual del credere guarantee,'0 does
not by the nature of his functions assume any risk resulting from
the transaction. 10 The Commission exempts from the prohibitions
of Article 85(1) contracts made with commercial agents who under-
take, within a specified Common Market area, to negotiate transac-
tions on behalf of an enterprise, to conclude transactions in the
name and on behalf of an enterprise, or to conclude transactions in
93. Id. art. 85(3)(b).
94. See AOIP/Beyrard, supra note 90, for an agreement between a self-employed inven-
tor and a socitk anonyme. The Commission held such inventor to be an "undertaking"
within the meaning of article 85. 19 O.J. Eue. Comm. (No. L 6) 12 (1976), 17 CoMM. MKT.
L.R. D22 (1976).
95. See text accompanying notes 10-15 supra.
96. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
97. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
98. Id. at 379.
99. Id. at 382.
100. A del credere guarantee is a guarantee of the customer's credit by the sales agent.
101. Communication of the Commission on Exclusive Dealing Contracts with Commer-
cial Agents of Dec. 24, 1962, 5 J.O. COMM. Eua. 2921 (1962).
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their own name and on behalf of that enterprise. 02 This exemption
presupposes, of course, that the particular agent refrain from acting
as an independent dealer. The Court of Justice has upheld this
dichotomy between independent dealers and commercial agents.
0 3
If, in the contract between principal and reseller, the principal
retains the risk of loss, that contract falls outside Article 85(1) prohi-
bitions.'0 The reseller may then "in principle be treated as an auxil-
iary organ forming an integral part of the [principal's] undertak-
ing, who must carry out his principal's instructions and thus, like a
commercial employee, forms an economic unit with this undertak-
ing."'10 A reseller accepting the risk of loss is thus considered an
independent dealer, rendering his contract, express or implied, sub-
ject to Article 85. By way of contrast, it is no longer safe under U.S.
antitrust law to rely on technical legal distinctions between an agent
and independent distributor.'0 In fact, the GTE Sylvania Court
held a distinction between sale and nonsale transactions insufficient
to justify the application of a per se rule in one situation and a rule
of reason in the other.'0 Considering the Supreme Court's extensive
reliance upon economic factors, including the delicate matter of
interbrand and intrabrand competition in returning to the rule of
reason in GTE Sylvania, there may be no remaining antitrust ad-
vantage in consignment or agency arrangements as contrasted with
distributorship appointments. 8 Factors relevant to the rule of rea-
son, rather than the form of the manufacturer-reseller relationship,
now govern the question of compliance with, and violation of, U.S.
antitrust law in the territorial restriction area. Factors potentially
justifying vertical restrictions include promotion of interbrand com-
petition, attraction of competent and aggressive resellers to manu-
facturers of new products or in new markets, provision of requisite
service and repair facilities, increased consumer product safety and
more effective warranty service.'"9
In the European Economic Community, Article 85(3) provides
flexibility beyond the American "rule of reason.""10 This is illus-
102. Id.
103. Co6peratieve vereniging "Suiker Unie" UA v. Comm. E.C., [1975] C.J. Comm. E.
Rec. 1663, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. RP. (CCH) 8334.
104. Communication of the Commission on Exclusive Dealing Contracts with Commer-
cial Agents, supra note 101.
105. Co6peratieve vereniging "Suiker Unie" UA v. Comm. E.C., supra note 103.
106. 433 U.S. at 54-57.
107. Id. at 57.
108. C. HILLS, supra note 7, § 2.22.
109. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 n.23 (1977).
110. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
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trated by the SABA ruling"' wherein the Commission approved
certain restrictive clauses on a finding that the distribution system,
as a whole, resulted in manufacturing and sales efficiency ulti-
mately beneficial to the consumer."' In instances of a weak market
position, the Court of Justice has held even an exclusive distributor-
ship providing for absolute territorial protection as exempted from
Article 85(1) prohibitions."3 Nevertheless, territorial restriction
clauses in exclusive distributorship agreements should still be con-
sidered at least potentially violative of Article 85."'
The "agreement-of-minor-importance" approach together with
the Commission's related quantitative and qualitative tests are also
of importance here."' Moreover, with particular reference to exclu-
sive dealing agreements, Regulation 67/67 exempts from Article
85(1) agreements involving only two enterprises and in which one
party agrees to supply only to the other party certain goods for resale
within a defined area of the Common Market. Exempted also are
arrangements in which one party agrees with the other to purchase
only from that other party certain goods for resale, or where the
latter two sets of provisions are combined, for mutual supply and
purchase for resale."' Such an automatic group exemption applies
only if there are no restrictions on competition beyond certain re-
straints as to competing goods" 7 or extraterritorial solicitation of
customers, establishment of branches, or maintenance of distribu-
tion facilities."8 A territorial restriction clause, based upon the
premises implicit in the STTL exclusive dealing clause"' should, in
a vertical setting, be permissible not only in the United States, but
also in the Common Market, especially if the particular distributor-
ship agreement imposes no prohibition upon sales outside the con-
tractual territory.
111. SABA [19751 Comm'n E. Comm., 19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 28) 19 (1976), 17
COMM. MKT. L.R. D61 (1976).
112. Id.
113. Socitk Anonyme Cadillon v. Firma H6ss, Maschinenbau KG, [1971] C.J. Comm.
E. Rec. 351, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8135.
114. EEC Establishing Treaty, supra note 16, arts. 85(1)(b) & (c).
115. See discussion accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
116. Reg. 67/67, supra note 72, arts. l(1)(a)-(c).
117. Id. art. (2)(1)(a).
118. Id. art. (2)(1)(b). The above mentioned reservations concerning agreements be-
tween more than two parties, mutual exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers,
difficulties of intermediaries and consumers in obtaining goods, exercise of industrial property
and others rights, and agreements covering all of the Common Market are of relevance here.
See text accompanying notes 74-82 supra.
119. See note 8 supra and accompanying text
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An inhibition of parallel imports and use of industrial property
rights to partition national markets must particularly be avoided
within the European Economic Community. The EEC has declared
national patents, trademarks and copyrights ineffective when their
use stifled the Common Market goal of free flow of goods across
national boundaries.'1 The Court of Justice of the European Com-
munities has held that national trademark rights cannot be ex-
ploited for the purpose of isolating the market of a Member State
within the European Economic Community.' 2 In a European exten-
sion of the exhaustion of rights principle,2 2 the Court of Justice has
held that the exercise of patent rights by a patentee in a Member
State to prevent the sale of a product first sold in another Member
State by the patentee or with his express or implied consent is
incompatible with EEC rules relating to the free circulation of
goods.12 With respect to copyrights, the Court of Justice confirmed
that a manufacturer of phonograph records may not exercise an
exclusive right granted by legislation of a Member State so as to
prevent the marketing in that state of products sold by that copy-
right owner or with his consent in another part of the Common
Market.'1
More than a decade ago, one American author expressed the
view that judicial doubts regarding proper restraints in connection
with know-how licenses arguably result from a suspicion that such
licenses "may easily serve as a convenient dodge for the cartel-
minded firm."'1 The bona fides of a know-how license, however,
might be ascertained on the basis of the value of the know-how
licensed.'" The more general opinion of commentators, subject to
some caution, is that provisions permissible in a patent license
120. See EEC Establishing Treaty, supra note 16, art. 36, which sanctions industrial
property rights, but not their use for arbitrary discrimination or disguised restriction on trade
between Member States.
121. Consten & Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. E.E.C. Comm'n [1966] C.J. Comm. E.
Rec. 429, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] CoMm. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046.
122. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453 (1873); Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S.
659 (1895). The principle is actually grounded in the common law traditional hostility to
encumbrances attached to chattels that had passed into commerce. See also P. AREEDA, Supra
note 38, at 446-47.
123. Centrafarm BV v. Sterling Drug, Inc., [1974] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 1147, 14 CoMm.
MKT. L.R. 480 (1974).
124. Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, [1971] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 487, COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8106.
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should, mutatis mutandis, be fit for a know-how license.'" Limita-
tions on territory of manufacture, safe as to patents and trademarks
on a nonexclusive basis, however, have been designated as doubtful
in the context of a know-how license.
28
Apart from the specific Article 36,121 broad provisions in Articles
85 and 86 may apply to industrial property matters. Some agree-
ment, decision by associations of enterprises, or concerted practice
is required for Article 85 to apply.'3 Thus, in the Parke Davis case,
the Court of Justice emphasized that the existence of patent rights
is not affected by Article'85 and 86 prohibitions.'13 The exercise of
such patent rights was also held outside the scope of Article 85(1)
limitations in the absence of any agreement, decision, or concerted
practice. '32 Moreover, the mere exercise of these rights would not fall
within Article 86, absent an abuse of a dominant position.'3 Not-
withstanding Parke Davis, the Court of Justice has been quick to
find agreement sufficient to bring into play Article 85(1).
I3
In the United States, where assignment of patent rights for
"any specified part of the United States" is specifically permitted
by statute, I3 illegal restraints have been found when patentees, in
effect, divided the market between themselves and a licensee or
between competing licensees.13 In the context of industrial and in-
tellectual property licenses, contractual language should arguably
allow a dealer to exercise independent business discretion in deter-
mining whether to sell the product, the proper place of sale, and the
potential customer.
137
127. BAROUNOS, supra note 24, at 235.
128. Donkers, The Evolution of Licensing Law in the EEC, 3 THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF
LICENSING 384.161, 384.176 (1977).
129. EEC Establishing Treaty, supra note 16, art. 36. See also note 120 supra and
accompanying text.
130. EEC Establishing Treaty, supra note 16, art. 85(1).
131. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, [1968] C.J. Comm. E. Rec. 81, [1967-1970 Transfer
Binder] COMM. MKT. RPP. (CCH) 8054.
132. See EEC Establishing Treaty, supra note 16, art. 85.
133. Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, supra note 131.
134. See Finnegan, The Ten Most Important Cases Governing the Law of Licensing in
the European Economic Community (EEC), 3 THE LAW AND BusiNEss op LICENSING 384.217
(1977).
135. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (Supp. 1978).
136. United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S.
319 (1947); Allied Research Prods., Inc. v. Heat Bath Corp., 161 USPQ 527 (N.D. I1. 1969).
For an expert review, see Farabow & Brunsvold, United States Antitrust Law, International
Licenses and the Protection of the United States Market-Are They Compatible?, 1
LICENSING L. & Bus. RP. 1 (1978).
137. P. SPERBER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 8-30 (1978). See also Girard,
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CONCLUSION
Patent and other industrial property rights have fared worse
than distributorship agreements in both antitrust systems herein
considered.' This may be consonant with the old fear of monopoly
concentration which engendered American antitrust law in the first
place, 3' and the quest for a breakdown of national barriers through
transnational competition which prompted EEC competition laws
in the second."10
Exclusive dealing and territorial restriction clauses should be
approached with great caution, not only in the United States,", but
also in the European Economic Community. 42 Under U.S. antitrust
law, exceptions to a sweeping prohibition of exclusive dealing and
territorial restriction clauses are founded on special circumstances,
including typically a relatively small market share and such factors
as a judicial or administrative desire to facilitate new entries, foster
interbrand competition, and promote consumer safety and satisfac-
tion."0
In the European Economic Community, exceptions are, to a
large extent, legislative and regulatory, manifesting an effort to pro-
vide a certain flexibility within a framework of predictability.,-
Given the particular historical background and perceived goals,' 0
distribution of goods in the European Economic Community has
received early attention and is subject to certain group exemp-
tions.' " Where a group exemption is unavailable, an individual ex-
emption or negative clearance may be pursued on the basis of var-
ious competitive factors, including generally those mentioned in the
preceding paragraph with respect to U.S. antitrust law." 7
Impact of United States Antitrust Laws on Territorially-Limited International Patent Licens-
ing Agreements, 11 U.S.F.L.R. 640 (1977).
138. See text accompanying notes 86-94 and 120-37 supra.
139. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
140. See text accompanying notes 15, 16 and 21 supra.
141. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (Supp. 1978); 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp.
1978) and text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
142. EEC Establishing Treaty, supra note 16, arts. 85, 86.
143. See text accompanying notes 46-55 and 109 supra. See also the excellent commen-
taries of Richard A. Givens, Laura P. Worsinger, Elizabeth Head, James T. Halverson and
William T. Lifland in MARKETING AND DISTRIBUTION, REGULATIONS AND REsTRAINTS (Practicing
Law Institute, Corporate Law and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 284 (N.Y. 1978))
9-98 and 129-50, with particular emphasis on 24-30 and 90-96.
144. See EEC Establishing Treaty, supra note 16, art. 85(3); EEC Council Regulation
17, supra note 37, art. 4 § 2, and text accompanying notes 35-37, 61-83 and 110-118 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 10-15 supra.
146. See Regulations 19/65, 67/67, 2779/72, supra note 37, and text accompanying notes
74-83 and 116-18 supra.
147. See note 37 and text accompanying notes 66-71 supra.
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No single contractual provision can realistically apply to all
exclusive dealing and territorrial restriction problems which poten-
tially could arise under United States or European Economic Com-
munity laws. However, it is hoped that the exclusive dealing clause
provided herein will gain acceptance under both sets of laws, and
will be useful to attorney and business persons in both the United
States and Europe.
